Did I lie about the Catechism and lying?
This is what I love about the Internet. Earlier this morning I had a post about lying, and I mentioned that the Catechism (in paragraph 2483) stated, “To lie is to speak or act against the truth in order to lead into error someone who has the right to know the truth.” No more than a few hours later an observant reader said that the part about “someone who has a right to know” is NOT in fact in the Catechism. Although I copied it straight from my Catechism sitting on my bookshelf, when I looked it up online, sure enough, paragraph 2483 stated “To lie is to speak or act against the truth in order to lead into error.” But in my copy of the Catechism DOES state “To lie is to speak or act against the truth in order to lead into error someone who has the right to know the truth.” So what is the story here?
It looks like this paragraph was actually changed between the original 1994 version of the Catechism (which is what I own) and the official version which was released in 1997. If you look at this page, you will see a large number of updates were made, including the following:
2483 The second sentence of this paragraph presently reads:
“To lie is to speak or act against the truth in order to lead into error someone who has the right to know the truth.”
This sentence will be modified to read:
To lie is to speak or act against the truth in order to lead someone into error.
Obviously, this change makes a major difference, and my whole argument in my previous post is based on the (removed) section of that sentence.
That being said, I’m not going to change my underlying argument that telling an untruth can be moral in certain extreme circumstances, such as saving the life of another. We have examples in Scripture of this occurring, and I do not think anyone in their right (moral) mind would condemn someone who deceived Nazis while hiding Jews. I do not think the new wording of the Catechism eliminates the possibility that one can tell an untruth to someone without the right to the truth, just that it does not explicitly condone it either and most likely wanted to avoid confusion in this area. Perhaps also those in charge of the Catechism wanted to prevent the possibility of the abuse of this condition; as I mentioned myself, it could be easily abused. But the very fact that the clause was in the first edition (which was vetted and edited by hundreds of bishops and theologians) shows that the concept is not against Catholic teaching.
Note also that I am not saying that someone is morally obligated to tell an untruth in those situations, just that it would not be immoral to do so (although if I was the Jew hiding in your basement I’d rather you did tell the untruth).
Eric,
If lying is “to speak or act against the truth in order to lead someone into error”, then apparently you don’t think lying is intrinsically wrong, because you think that if it will bring about a greater good (or prevent a greater evil) lying is justifiable. So, in that case, exactly what is wrong with lying? Is lying only wrong when it harms others? (Does that mean that lying does not intrinsically harm ourselves?) In other words, are you taking a consequentialist approach to the immorality of lying?
If lying is sometimes permissible, then why isn’t the use of contraceptives sometimes permissible? I mean, if using our sexual organs in the sexual act while thwarting the intended purpose of our sexual organs is intrinsically wrong, then why is it not intrinsically wrong to use our truth-communicating organ (our tongue) in the communicative act, while thwarting the intended communicative purpose of the tongue?
In the peace of Christ,
- Bryan
The irony with your position is that it undermines the idea that there are moral absolutes — acts that in themselves and without exception are always wrong. So you are saying that under certain circumstances it is not wrong to lie, even though the Commandments condemn lying.
The reason this is ironic is that those who favor abortion claim the same thing. That it is isn’t always morally wrong to have an abortion, and that certain circumstances justify abortion.
This does not eliminate the difficulty over truth telling in extreme situations – the Nazi at the door, so to speak. I think the more rigorous answer is that you should say something like “I couldn’t say” or just refuse to answer. This may lead to suffering on the part of the one who refuses to answer, but the Catechism and Veritatis Splendor say that we may be called to martrydom to defend the moral truths of our faith.
Others argue in favor of one of the other technically true answers (“I haven’t seen any in my house” when this is not my house). The problem with these answer is that they are probably meant to mislead the hearer. In such cases, perhaps you’d just have to rely on the idea of duress and the extreme infringement on your freedom created by an unjust situation – in such cases your subjective guilt would be mitigated to the extent that you did not feel free to conform to the moral law. So it wouldn’t be a mortal sin, even though the lie would still be wrong.
Of course, others could argue this same justification for abortions — all of these difficult problems are an inherent part of a moral system that claims there are exceptionless moral absolutes, and that morality doesn’t depend upon circumstances or subjective motivations.
Bryan and Sally,
I don’t think my position (which the authors of the original Catechism obviously agreed with) leads to moral relativism. I am not saying that lying is sometimes allowed, I am saying that telling an untruth is not always a lie, and thus can be moral.
There is a big difference and these definitions matter. For example, murdering someone is always morally wrong (no exceptions), killing someone is not (self-defense, just war, etc.). Noting the conditions which define an act are not the same as consequentialism.
Bryan and Sally:
The CCC a little further along:
2488 The right to the communication of the truth is not unconditional. Everyone must conform his life to the Gospel precept of fraternal love. This requires us in concrete situations to judge whether or not it is appropriate to reveal the truth to someone who asks for it.
2489 Charity and respect for the truth should dictate the response to every request for information or communication. The good and safety of others, respect for privacy, and the common good are sufficient reasons for being silent about what ought not be known or for making use of a discreet language. The duty to avoid scandal often commands strict discretion. No one is bound to reveal the truth to someone who does not have the right to know it.
That’s clear enough, I think. The problem the Nazi example raises is one where silence is tantamount to giving the answer anyway. You can certainly take the position that in that case you are required to sacrifice the lives of the people you are hiding, but I don’t think you can flatly say that this just _is_ Catholic teaching. Certainly not on the basis of what the Catechism says.
Lying is an EXTREMELY difficult topic.
Catholic moral teaching clearly believes in absolute moral norms, but it doesn’t say that *all* moral norms are absolute. Some people hold that lying doesn’t belong to the class of actions that are always wrong–they say it’s like breaking a window (usually wrong) rather than like contraception (always wrong). Some hold that lying is always wrong, but then they have to explain what to do when it’s necessary to conceal some truth (Jews in the basement). As someone rightly pointed out in one of the threads here, just refusing to answer isn’t always adequate.
An entire theory rose up distinguishing between different types of “mental reservation,” in which you say something that’s strictly true but that might well lead the person off-track and thereby prevent them from finding out the truth. The idea is to hide the truth while avoiding lying, but it’s not at all easy to know when this is legitimate and when it is just a complicated sophistical excuse for lying.
In short, this is a topic where extremely smart and learned people have trouble agreeing and can feel quite unsure.
The older moral theology books explain the difference between strict and broad mental reservation. Broad mental reservation is permitted for a good reason. For example, if a Nazi officer asked me if I had any Jews in my home, I could say “no” – meaning I don’t have any in my home that I intend to tell you about. That’s probably why the 1994 version of the Catholic Catechism used the definition it used.
I think your explanation is correct. Probably the newer version leaves out the last condition (without comment) in order to prevent misuse.
This is an area where doctrine is in development, but the Magisterium is moving towards of view without the possible exceptions used in the past such as mental reservation. If lying is objectively evil than circumstances such as saving a life do not matter. Remember torture apologist often refer to such situations.
I think the Magisterium is moving towards saying it is objectively evil to lie. Though for now we may prudentially argue about this.
I think that on their judgement day, someone who lied to a Nazi about a Jew hiding in the attic would be quite safe.
In response to Dean — I fully agree this is a very complex problem, but the quoted passages from the Catechism do not seem to me to support the idea that lying to the Nazi is acceptable — for instance:
“The good and safety of others, respect for privacy, and the common good are sufficient reasons for being silent about what ought not be known or for making use of a discreet language.”
This does not seem to support saying “NO! There’s no Jewish people in my house.” It would support saying nothing or using one of those statements that aren’t completely forthcoming.
Again, I do think that duress seems to play a role in explaining the subjective guilt of those in this situation. Furthermore, I’m not really sure that the example is all that likely to happen. Do the hypothetical Nazi’s really go around asking people about whether there are Jews hiding somewhere and then really believe the answer?
Getting back to the abortion example that prompted this post, the question was whether someone who goes undercover into an abortion clinic and lies in order to expose wrongdoing are sinning by their lies. They go out and lie intentionally, without the pressure of our example Nazi’s.
I think it is a mistake to decide intentinoally to lie like this, and it seems to me that one is sinning by doing so. Satan is the “father of lies” – to decide that we must adopt his methods in order to end an evil seems self-defeating to me. Going into his camp is dangerous business.
No worries – you are spot on with this one.
I posted on it previously and my post says basically the same thing:
http://marysaggies.blogspot.com/2009/11/is-lying-always-wrong.html
Sally-
Furthermore, I’m not really sure that the example is all that likely to happen. Do the hypothetical Nazi’s really go around asking people about whether there are Jews hiding somewhere and then really believe the answer?
This is an excellent point – especially the last bit.
Getting back to the abortion example that prompted this post, the question was whether someone who goes undercover into an abortion clinic and lies in order to expose wrongdoing are sinning by their lies. They go out and lie intentionally, without the pressure of our example Nazi’s.
I agree with this as well. I commented on the original post to this effect – I don’t think this is really comparable with the hypothetical Nazi business, and I think this kind of lying is a lot harder to justify.
It seems to me the critical question is whether or not “lying” is intrinsically evil or not. I would really like to see something with some authority addressing that directly. I remain doubtful – if lying is always and everywhere wrong, what do you do with Rahab?
Anybody have any suggestions for further reading?
If you read further on the discussion of truth in the 1997 edition of the CCC, in 2488 and 2489 it discusses this issue, particularly relevant is:
“The right to the communication of the truth is not unconditional.”
“No one is bound to reveal the truth to someone who does not have the right to know it”
So largely the same conditions for lying that were used in the old edition seem to appear in the new edition as well.
Also for hiding Jews, this quote might be useful in 2489:
“The good and safety of others, respect for privacy, and the common good are sufficient reasons for being silent about what ought not be known or for making use of a discreet language.”
I ran in to this very example several years ago when teaching eighth grade students about the commandments. One young man brought up the situation of hiding Jews from the Nazis. I was temporarily stumped and had to do some research. I consulted a moral theologian, and he gave me the same explanation that you have given, Eric.
It seems to me that purposefully misleading someone is no different than telling an untruth. Also, remaining silent in the face of a direct question is in effect giving a non-verbal answer. If the strict interpretation is correct then the only acceptable answer to the Nazi is “there are Jews in my basement.” That simply can not be correct.
Another common case to consider is actions of police in the pursuit of justice. They often lie to suspects (“we matched your DNA”, “your partner is confessing in the next room”, etc.).
I hold fast to my interpretation of the moral law. It can never be morally permissible to tell a lie. It is therefore always sinful to tell a lie, irrespective of reason or cause, for the ends can never justify the means. If it does, then this is relativism by its very definition. You have stated yourself the “To lie is to speak or act against the truth in order to lead someone into error.” What is seems is that everyone is splitting this phrase into two. The phrase “in order to lead someone into error” cannot be removed as a qualifier for the phrase “To lie is to speak or act against the truth.”
This is why if an untruth is told, it is not absolutely immoral. it must be qualified by the second part of the definition. This is why to say that the grass is purple, WITHOUT the intent to lead into error (eg. as a joke, while being sarcastic), is not a lie, and is therefore not immoral.
This is also why to say a valid, factual, and true statement such as “dog is in the house,” WITH the intent to lead into error because you believe that the dog is not in the house, then a lie and a sin is committed, EVEN if the dog is truly in the house.
Therefore, the only way to avoid being morally culpable of a sin in regards to the questions of the Nazis, only true statements may be given. The best way is to give true statements that avoid revealing the location of the Jews. Therefore, for instance, the Jews should have been told to leave the house if anyone came to the door, which upon questioning would allow you to have the mind that they are in fact “not there.” You could also ask questions such as “Why would I be stupid enough to keep Jews in my house against the will of the government?” or “No Jew has ever set foot through this door,” (because they came through the window, or the back door.
We must also seek to utilize the proper definitions issued and accepted by the Church and the law, not trying to add additional phrases, or removing phrases that are not there.
Lying (as defined), therefore, is always a sin. The right thing to do therefore, is not to “lie.”
The right to the communication of the truth is not unconditional. Everyone must conform his life to the gospel precept of fraternal love. This requires us in concrete situations to judge whether or not it is appropriate to reveal the truth to someone who asks for it (CCC 2488).
AND
“Charity and respect for the truth should dictate the response to every request for information or communication. The good and safety of others, respect for privacy, and the common good are sufficient reasons for being silent about what ought not be known or for making use of a discreet language. The duty to avoid scandal often commands strict discretion. No one is bound to reveal the truth to someone who does not have the right to know it (CCC 2489).”
The reservation of truth is the only thing allowed by these statements. “Discrete language,”"silent,” and “reveal the truth.” It says nothing of lying or even untruths. Therefore, the “right to know it” portion only applies to how much truth should be revealed, or inversely, concealed. It, however, does not impose the obligation or ability to lie without moral culpability.
Interesting post and comments; however, this is a great burr under my saddle, this narrow view of morality that would find lying to a Nazi seeking to kill Jews is an intrinsic sin.
That’s the sort of Pharisee-like morality that drove Jesus to overturn tables and kick butt.
The shorts-twisting worry about falling into the clutches of relativsim as expressed by some here is, well, silly if it wasn’t so wrong and dangerous, too.
Many things that conservative Christians want to say are “moral absolutes,” probably aren’t…..
The Lord is Absolute. We can know this philosophically and personally, I believe. But the fact is, we aren’t really built to apprehend absolute truth…
We are built to apprehend truth. And Truth.
The essence of the universe, of the Lord Himself, is a personal relationship. that’s what’s behind the idea that love sums up all of morality: Love God, love your neighbor.
It’s not following a contingent, farther-down version of the truth: the commmandments are versions of “the truth about the Truth,” set out to help us live.
The command against adultery apparently can’t be absolute, because it appears the need for it will end at some time, or after time, in Glory, as Jesus said there is no marrying in heaven.
It’s no sin to lie to the Devil.
So stop some of this moral idiocy of believing that telling the factual facts at all times somehow is practicing goodness, love and righteousness.
Under that guise, even hiding Jews, or anyone needing shelter, would be a “lie,” and therefore immoral.
Come on people; children can understand these distinctions.
Try to entertain two opposing goals in your mind: be wise as a serpent but innocent as a dove.
Be willing to sacrifice your own life to save others. Don’t be willing to sacrifice others’ lives to save your own stupid self-righteousness.
When your fat, ugly little daughter trips down the steps in her new dress to ask if she looks pretty, are you going to “tell the truth,” and crush her soul, or “lie,” and love her?
Come on.
Please read about Blessed Pope John xxiii:
http://themoderatevoice.com/10010/pope-john-xxiii-rescued-thousands-of-jews/
Please also see this about Pope Pius xii during WWII
http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v13/v13n5p26_Martinez.html